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PROPOSED REVISIONS CONCERNING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
CAVEAT VENDOR 
James J. White 
Both industrial sellers and consumer sellers 
should look at proposals for revision of the sections 
relating to warranty liability in Article 2 . 
Particularly important are the sections on warranty, 
express and implied, on third-party liability, 
disclaimers and limitation of remedy, notice, and 
statute of limitations. Using current law as a 
baseline, revised Article 2 increases sellers' 
liability in at least half a dozen ways and decreases 
it in no significant way. 
1. Express Warranty, 2-313. Revised 2-313 
expands sellers' liability in at least three important 
ways. 
a. For all practical purposes the reliance 
requirement is gone from 2-313. 
Reliance on a warranty was a 
requirement for recovery under the 
Sales Act; in current Article 2 express 
warranties must be part of the "basis 
of the bargain." This requirement has 
now shrunk to a provision that denies 
warranty liability only where the 
seller "establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the buyer was 
unreasonable in concluding that an 
affirmation or promise, description or 
sample became part of the agreement." 
b. Revised Section 2-313(c) 
"presumptively" creates a warranty to 
persons who were not parties to the 
contract with certain limitations 
specified i-313 (d). 
c. Revised Section 2-313(a) contains the 
statement from current 2-313 that words 
like "warrant" and "guarantee" need not 
be included to make a warranty, but 
omits the reference in current 2-313 to 
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puffing ("but an affirmation merely of 
the value of the goods or a statement 
merely to be the seller's opinion or 
accommodation of the goods does not 
create a warranty.") 
d. consider how the new modifications 
might work. 
(1), Assume that United Airlines buys 
Pratt & Whitney jet engines for 
its new 737s. The engines do not 
produce the thrust as promised, 
require more maintenance than 
expected and require expensive 
protection against icing. Assume 
that Pratt and Whitney had an 
effective disclaimer in its 
agreement with United Airlines and 
had warned that in certain 
applications the engine would not 
perform exactly as both it and 
United had hoped it would. 
May united search the united 
States, or perhaps the world 
market, for advertisements, 
brochures, and technical manuals 
that have been passed out to 
potential buyers by Pratt & 
Whitney describing this engine? If 
they find one that specifies how 
it deals with ice, projected time 
until overhaul, projected 
maintenance costs, may they rely 
on it, notwithstanding the fact 
they did not have such express 
warranties in their contract? Note 
that there is no requirement in 2-
313(c) that the warranty be part 
of the contract between the buyer 
and seller. Nor is there any 
requirement there that the buyer 
know of the warranty only that it 
be made to the "public." 
Presumably all advertisements--
even if not widely distributed--
are to the "public" and so 
available for ex post facto 
reliance. 
Section 2-313(d) denies the 
warranty if it is made to "a 
segment of the public of which the 
buyer was not a part". Since 
"consumer" is used elsewhere but 
not here, it is clear that 
"public" does not refer just to 
'consumers. Presumably united 
Airlines is a segment of the 
public. Moreover its "segment" 
would include all airlines flying 
737's. 
(2) Assume that China Air Lines sues 
Pratt & Whitney for promises made 
in private negotiations to United 
Airlines and for promises made in 
certain technical manuals and 
brochures distributed to several 
potential buyers in the United 
States. Assume for the purpose of 
the argument that China Air Lines 
did not know of those promises 
until it took discovery after it 
had commenced its law suit. 
can Pratt & Whitney win on the 
argument that under 2-313(b) that 
"the buyer was unreasonable in 
concluding that an affirmation, 
promise, description, or sample 
became part of the agreement." · If 
one assumes that the buyer had to 
know of the warranty at the time 
the agreement was made (i.e., one 
in ignorance of a promise is 
incapable of concluding that the 
promise became part of the · 
agreement), there is some hope for 
sellers. That is not what the 
section means; the buyer will 
argue that its reasonableness must 
be measured after it found out 
about the affirmation. Ignorance 
of the affirmation is no defense. 
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Buyer could have diffi~ulty 
proving that private promises to 
other airlines should become part 
of its agreement . on the other 
hand, the same engine should 
perform the same way in a 737 
whether it is in China Air Lines' 
737 or the 737 of united. 
It is hard to see how a seller 
will successfully defend a case 
under 2-313(b) since it must show 
by "clear and convincing evidence" 
that the buyer was unreasonable. 
If buyer's ignorance of the 
warrants at the time of the deal 
does not render reliance 
unreasonable, what does? 
(3) Assume a buyer who sees the 
television advertisement that 
shows how a Lincoln Continental 
squats down one or two inches when 
it goes fast and emphasizes the 
power and performance of its 
engine. Buyer is involved in an 
accident and sues the seller for 
breach of warranty based upon that 
television ad. Assume further that 
the automobile is successful 
beyond the Ford's dream and 
attracts a large number of aging 
Corvette drivers who drive just as 
fast as when they were young, but 
not as well. Those buyers have a 
wide range of accidents with the 
new Continental. Plaintiff brings 
a class action suit dependent upon 
the advertisement and irrespective 
of the fact that most of the 
purchasers of the automobile never 
saw the television advertisement. 
If the advertisement is an 
affirmation or a promise of how 
the automobile will handle at high 
speed and is broken , can there now 
be a recovery on behalf of the 
class irrespective of the fact 
that only a few of them ever saw 
the advertisement? Surely Ford 
will have a hard time showing wby 
clear and convincing evidencew 
that the buyers were unreasonable 
in concluding that the affirmation 
was part of the bargain if it is 
not protected by a buyer's 
ignorance of the advertisement. As 
to some of the damages, Ford might 
be saved by revised 2-318(d)(3)(no 
consequential damages against a 
remote seller). 
c. Revised 2-313 invites every 
disappointed industrial buyer to make 
claims on the basis of technical 
writings, brochures, television 
advertisements, and written 
advertisements. Presumably consumers 
can be foreclosed by making the 
advertisements yet less informative 
than they are today. (See the cigarette 
ads.) But I doubt that we should give 
industrial sellers a major disincentive 
against disclosure of technical 
material. If the technical material is 
important for the buyer to understand 
the product and to determine whether it 
is suitable for buyer's use, it is 
desirable to encourage the seller to 
give as much detail to the buyer as 
possible. If, no matter what the 
contract says, such disclosure may 
become a warranty--as seems to be the 
case under 2-313--revised 2-313 will 
give the seller an incentive not to 
1isclose relevant data in its 
industrial advertising and technical 
materials. 
2. Section 2-314. Implied warranty of 
Merchantability 
The only significant addition in revised 2-
314 is subsection 2-314(b)(7) which says 
that a seller impliedly warrants "in the 
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case of goods purchased for human 
consumption or for application to the human 
body, [the goods are] reasonably fit for 
consumption or application." The comment 
notes that this section rejects the 
"foreign/natural ingredient" dichotomy and 
leaves the courts to determine when goods 
containing natural ingredients (e.g., bones, 
cherry pits ••• ) are not reasonably fit 
for consumption. If that were all revised 2-
314(b)(7) did, sellers should have no 
complaint. 
Revised 2-314(b)(7) can be read as aimed at 
the pariah products (cigarettes, alcohol, 
snuff, guns, and even butter). Recall the 
old comment, undoubtedly written by Prosser 
that appears in current 402(A) which says: 
"Good whiskey is not unreasonably 
dangerous merely because it will make 
some people drunk, and is especially 
dangerous to alcoholics; but bad 
whiskey, containing a dangerous amount 
of fusel oil, is unreasonably 
dangerous. Good tobacco is not 
unreasonably dangerous merely because 
the effects of smoking may be harmful; 
but tobacco containing something like 
marijuana may be unreasonably 
dangerous. Good butter is not 
unreasonably dangerous merely because, 
if such be the case, it deposits 
cholesterol in the arteries and leads 
to heart attacks; but bad butter, 
contaminated with poisonous fish oil, 
is unreasonably dangerous." Restatement 
of Torts 2d S 402A, Comment i. 
Arguably no exception like that in the 
402(A) comment was ever built into 2-314. It 
always required goods to be fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which they are used 
and one could always have argued that if 
cigarettes cause cancer, they are not fit 
for those ordinary purposes. On the other 
hand, under the current 2-314, one could 
argue that "ordinary purposes" have the 
meaning described by Prosser's comment in 
402(A), namely that the warranty was freedom 
from foreign substances, not a warranty that 
the substances known to be present in 
cigarettes or alcohol would not be 
injurious. Under that interpretation, 
cigarettes that caused cancer or heart 
disease, alcohol that caused drunkenness and 
cirrhosis, bullets that killed and butter 
that fattened would not be lacking in 
merchantability because of those facts. 
The addition of (b)(7) makes that argument 
harder for a defendant seller. To maintain 
that cigarettes are "fit for ordinary 
purposes" because their ordinary purposes 
are to make people psychologically content, 
to satisfy their cravings for nicotine and 
oral stimulation is harder under the 
proposed language, for revised 2-314 makes 
the specific warranty that such goods are 
reasonably fit for "consumption". The new 
warranty seems to be saying more than they 
are fit for ordinary purposes; it is saying 
they are fit for a particular purpose, 
namely, consumption, i.e., a warranty that 
"this commodity does not cause disease." 
Do we wish to impose such an implied 
warranty on the manufacture of consumer 
products that are known or widely believed 
to have injurious consequences when a large 
part of the adult population of the world--
knowing of those injurious consequences--
nevertheless chooses to confront them? I · 
doubt it. If that is what 2-314(b)(7) means, 
I assume that the manufacturers of snuff, 
cigarettes, alcohol--possibly even butter, 
coffee, and the like--will argue for change 
in ( b} ( 7). 
3. Section 2-316 
Section 2-316 is similar to the old 2-316 
but it has two or three changes that are 
deleterious to the seller's interests. 
a. Compare old (3)(b) with new (d)(2). 
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Section 2-316(3 ) (b). Not\ttrithstandl.ng 
subsection (2) ••• (b) when the buyer 
before entering into the contract has 
examined the goods or the sample or model as 
fully as he desired or has refused to 
examine the goods there is no implied 
warranty with regard to def ect s which an 
examination ought in the circumstances to 
have revealed to him[.] 
Revised Section 2-316(d) (2). Except in a 
consumer contract, the following rules 
apply: ••. (2) If the buyer before 
entering into the contract has examined the 
goods or the sample or model as fully as 
desired or has refused to examine the goods, 
there is no implied warranty with regard to 
nonconformities that an examination in the 
circumstances would have revealed. 
The former section burdens the buyer with 
defects the buyer "ought" to have seen, but 
the new section burdens him only with 
defects which inspection "would have 
revealed." Assume a buyer who inspects, 
fails to see a defect (and whose examina-
tion, therefore, did not and therefore would 
not have revealed them) and sues. Assume, 
for example, that a prospective buyer of a 
used 737 from United Airlines, examines the 
airplane but fails to take off the panels on 
the bottom and so does not examine the ribs 
and the keel. If he had done so, assume he 
would have discovered that the ribs and keel 
were heavily corroded. Six months after the 
purchase buyer sues seller for breach of 
warranty. Under the current 2-316, if it 
could be proven that a normal inspection 
"ought" to and would have uncovered the 
defects, the buyer would be stuck. under the 
new wording, having done an inspection, 
buyer can argue ·that his inspection was 
adequate and that the absence of the "ought" 
language means that (d)(2) does not reach 
this case. In effect the buyer would argue 
that when an inspection has been done, no 
hypothetical inspection is assumed. 
b. For practical purposes revised 2-316(e) 
outlaws disclaimers against consumers. It 
states: "the terms are inoperative unless 
the seller proves by clear and convincing 
evidence that the seller understood and 
expressly agreed to the term." Will the 
consumer's initials beside the disclaimer be 
effective? I doubt it. Seller must show not 
only that the consumer buyer saw the 
disclaimer, read it, but also that he 
understood it and "agreed" to it. What 
evidence clearly and convincingly proves 
"understanding"? Short of the buyer's 
admission, I know of none. I wonder if 
subsection (e) is drafted the way it is 
because the Drafting Committee was not 
willing to say the truth: "disclaimers are 
ineffective against consumers." 
But why should disclaimers be ineffective 
against consumers? Most consumers can read; 
even people who have never been to law 
school can understand language like "As Is," 
"We make no warranties about these used 
cars". It has always seemed to me that 
consumer advocates are disdainful of the 
intelligence of their clients. Note that 
revised section 2-316 has little to do with 
consumers who are injured because those 
consumers have tort claims that will not be 
touched by warranty disclaimers. 
4. Section 2-318. Rights of third parties who 
have no contract with the seller 
a. The rule stated in revised 2-318(b) is 
a good one. Sellers stumbling upon 2-
318(b) might think that they have found 
something in revised Article 2 that is 
favorable to a seller because it 
appears to equate the rights of a 
remote buyer to the rights of the 
initial buyer. But what subsection (b) 
gives, subsection (c) takes away. It 
reads in full as follows: 
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Revised S 2-318(c). 
(c) A buyer's rights and remedies for 
breach of a warranty are determined under 
this article, as modified by subsection (d), 
without regard to privity of contract or the 
terms of the contract between the seller and 
the immediate buyer if: 
(1) the buyer is a consumer to 
whom a warranty was extended under 
subsection (a) and the Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act applies or the seller is a 
merchant under Section 2-314(a) who sold 
unmerchantable goods; or 
(2) the buyer is a member of the 
public to whom an express warranty was made 
by the seller under Section 2-313(c) or (d). 
b. I am uncertain about the meaning of 
revised 2-318(c)(l). Probably it 
applies only to buyers (i) who are 
consumers and (ii) who are covered by 
Magnuson Moss or who have a claim 
against a merchant under 2-314(a). The 
other way to read it is to say that it 
applies to all buyers and that it 
covers (i) consumers under the Magnuson 
Moss Act and (ii) all buyers where 
there is warranty of merchantability 
under 2-314(a). I think the latter 
interpretation is incorrect. 
c. Note that (c)(2) takes away much of the 
protection given by (b). Since 
warranty to the public is not defined 
in 2-313(c) or (d) and since it is 
possible that a warranty could be to a 
member of the public even though it was 
made in a private context. The 
subsection gives doubtful protection. 
In any event, subsection (c) clearly 
turns loose remote parties when the 
buyer's claim is based on advertising, 
brochures or the like. 
d. The most serious threat to sellers from 
2-318, is the "discovery" rule for the 
statute of limitat1ons in revised 2-
318(d)(3). Instead of the standard 
statute of limitation which runs from 
the time of the original sale {or from 
the subsequent sale), this runs from 
the time the remote buyer discovers or 
should have discovered the breach. 
Under this rule sellers can expect suit 
from remote buyers who claim never to 
have discovered the breach until a 
product failed many years after the 
sale. (Never mind that the machine had 
been overhauled 17 times.) 
e. There is at least one nice thing in 2-
318 for sellers. That is (d)(3) which 
prohibits remote buyers from recovering 
consequential damages. Even that 
present is limited by its reference to 
(d)(2) and by the proviso that the 
recovery can be had against an 
intermediate seller for consequential 
damages. 
5. Notice, Revised Section 2-606(c)(l) 
a. Section 2-607(3) and Article 39 of the 
CISG cut off a buyer's right to sue. 
section 2-607(3) reads in part as 
follows: "Where tender has been 
accepted, the buyer must within a 
reasonable time after he discovers or 
should have discovered any breach 
notify the seller of breach or be 
barred from any remedy." Section 2-
606(c)(1) of the revision says: "the 
buyer within a reasonable time after 
the buyer discovers or should have 
discovered a breach, shall notify the 
seller of the breach. However, a 
failure to give proper notice does not 
bar the buyer from any remedy that does 
not prejudice the seller." 
Note two things about the new 
terminology. First, it does not say 
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directly what happens if the buyer 
fails to give notice. Only by inference 
does one conclude that certain remedies 
might be cut off. second, to the 
extent that the seller is unable to 
prove prejudice, the failure to give 
notice is not relevant to a later suit. 
One can only guess how the courts will 
use ,this term, but it is possible that 
it will effectively delete a notice 
requirement from the law. 
b. Assume that seller sells two generators 
for $1 million each to buyer. Assume 
some difficulty with the generators and 
that seller does some repairs after 
they are installed. A year after the 
last work has been done the buyer 
notifies the seller of breach, asks for 
revocation of acceptance, and sues for 
damages. What are the consequences of 
2-606 (c)(l)? Who must prove what? 
The seller is likely to say had he been 
notified earlier he would have been 
more diligent in his repairs, that he 
might have replaced the generators, or 
that he might have done other things to 
determine whether the cause of the 
deficiency was his or another person's. 
These complaints of seller are likely 
to be diffuse and non specific. Is the 
burden on him to prove prejudice or the 
burden on the buyer to prove the 
absence of prejudice? Assume that he 
does prove prejudice, what is the 
remedy? Under the current notice 
provision, the one failing to give 
notice is barred from all remedy; it is 
unequivocal. The same is true in the 
CISG, but there is no such bar 
specified in revised 2-606. 
c. To the extent one regards the notice 
requirement in 2-607(3) as analogous to 
a statute of repose (i.e., after a 
certain period of time--when I have 
heard nothing bad from my buyer--who 
may have been having some difficulties 
with the product, I can rest at ease). 
Presumably seller's lack of sleep is 
not "prejudice" under 2-606(c}{1}. 
Should we dilute the strong incentive 
for quick action on the part of buyers? 
Revised 2-606's dilution encourages 
"warranty" suits that really arise not 
from breach of warranty but from 
buyer's remorse. I am always suspicious 
of a buyer who does not complain at the 
time he learns of the defect, but only 
after he finds that he can buy the same 
product or a better one at a lower 
price or that he has no use for the one 
purchased. 
6. Agreed remedies, revised Section 2-719. 
a. Section 2-719(b} retains the familiar 
denial of an exclusive remedy when it 
"fails of its essential purpose." 
Subsection (b}{2} says that "agreed 
remedies outside the scope of and not 
dependent on the failed agreed remedy 
are enforceable as provided in this 
section." From the comment it appears 
that revised (b}(2) validates 
agreements excluding consequential 
damages and the like even if other 
remedies fail. It indorses the American 
Electric Power line of cases on the 
question whether consequential damages 
limitations survive ouster of repair 
and replacement terms. Referring to 
only agreed remedies as "being 
enforceable" leaves the matter a little 
unclear. Invariably these "agreed 
remedies" are not "remedies" but 
prohibitions of remedies (i.e., "no 
consequential damages"). 
b. Revised Section 2-719 makes 
prohibitions of consequential damages 
invalid against consumers. The 
prohibition is easy to understand when 
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one is talking of personal injury but 
hard to understand otherwise. 
Assume consumer buys an automobile; the 
automobile fails to start several 
mornings during a Minnesota February. 
As a result of consumer's late arrival 
at work on those mornings, she is fired 
from her job and--according to her 
later complaint--was despondent, is 
divorced, and suffers hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of lost wages, 
pain and suffering, and loss of 
consortium. Of course, one can argue 
that there was no proximate 
relationship between the unmerchantable 
automobile and loss of her job, much 
less her loss of marriage, but tell 
that to a jury. Why should not she be 
subject to the same sort of limitations 
that business buyers are, at least with 
respect to non-personal-injury losses? 
Consumers have economic losses and 
their losses for "pain and suffering•• 
where there is no personal injury are 
hard to quantify and easy to 
exaggerate. Why not allow their 
prohibition? 
7. Revised Section 2-725 
a. In some ways the most threatening 
proposal of all for sellers is found in 
alternative two to revised 2-725(c)(2). 
That section would adopt the "discovery 
rule," for the statute of limitations 
in warranty cases. Currently the 
statute runs from the time of sale. 
b. Assume that buyer buys 747 from Boeing. 
The aircraft works perfectly for six 
years. At the beginning of the sixth 
year, expensive additions have to be 
made to hydraulic system and to the 
mechanical parts of the rudder. Boeing 
maintains that the express or implied 
warranties given at the time of sale 
have run out. The buyer argues that it 
could not have discovered the problem 
and can therefore sue for breach of 
warranty under 2-313 and 2-314. Because 
the warranty commences to run only on 
buyer's discovery of the defect. Why 
should a seller be liable indefinitely 
for an economic loss? Because of the 
discovery rule in torts is that there 
is no effective statute of limitations 
in many tort cases. Sellers of 
commodities that have the possibility 
of injuring users remain perpetually 
liable as long as the plaintiff can 
claim that he did not discover the 
defect until shortly before he was 
injured. 
The rise of the discovery rule in torts 
is one of the most pernicious changes 
in our law since 1900. I would argue 
that that rule should not be 
incorporated into our sales law. It 
need not be added here to save 
consumers because any consumer whose 
blood has been spilt will be able to 
recover on a tort theory outside of 
Article 2. 
CONCLUSION 
By my calculation there is one small scrap in 
this heap for sellers, namely, a restriction on 
consequential damages found in 2-318. Everything 
else--including things that seem to be favorable to 
sellers such as the incorporation of the third-party 
beneficiary theory in 2-318(a)--proves to be 
inconsequential or contrary to the seller's interests. 
Some of these are contrary to the seller's interests 
in a small way; others could grow large. If the 
Drafting Committee had followed the direction of the 
Article 2 Study Committee, it would have proposed few 
or none of the changes I have discussed above. Unless 
there is considerable change in these provisions, I 




To see how a modern commercial sales law dealing 
only with business parties might describe a seller's 
liability, consider sections 35 through 40 of the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods 
Section II. Conformity of the goods and third party 
claims 
Article 35 
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of 
the quantity , quality and description required by the 
contract and which are contained or packaged in the 
manner required by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed 
otherwise, the goods do not conform with the contract 
unless they: 
(a) Are fit for the purposes for which goods of 
the same description would ordinarily be 
used; 
(b) Are fit for any particular purpose expressly 
or impliedly made known to the seller at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract, 
except where the circumstances show that the 
buyer did not rely, or that it was 
unreasonable for him to rely, on the 
seller's skill and judgment; 
(c) Possess the qualities of goods which the 
seller has held out to the buyer as a sample 
or model; 
(d) Are contained or packaged in the manner 
usual for such goods or, where there is no 
such manner, in a manner adequate to 
preserve and protect the goods. 
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs 
(a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for any lack of 
conformity of the goods if at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not 
have been unaware of such lack of conformity. 
Article 36 
(1) The seller is liable in accordance with the 
contract and this Convention for any lack of 
conformity which exists at the time when the risk 
passes to the buyer, even though the lack of 
conformity becomes apparent only after that time. 
(2) The seller is also liable for any lack of 
conformity which occurs after the time indicated in 
the preceding paragraph and which is due to a breach 
of any of his obligations, including a breach of any 
guarantee that for a period of time the goods will 
remain fit for their ordinary purpose or for some 
particular purpose or will retain specified qualities 
of characteristics. 
Article 37 
If the seller has delivered goods before the date 
for delivery, he may, up to that date, deliver any 
missing part or make up any deficiency in the quantity 
of the goods delivered, or deliver goods in 
replacement of any nonconforming goods delivered or 
remedy any lack of conformity in the goods delivered, 
provided that the exercise of this right does not 
cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or 
unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any 
right to claim damages as provided for in this 
Convention. 
Article 38 
(1) The buyer must examine the goods, or cause 
them to be examined, within as short a period as is 
practicable in the circumstances. 
(2) If the contract involves carriage of the 
goods, examination may be deferred until after the 
goods have arrived at their destination. 
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(3) If the goods are redirected in transit or 
redispatched by the buyer without a reasonable 
opportunity for examination by him and at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or 
ought to have known of the possibility of such 
redirection or redispatch, examination may be deferred 
until after the goods have arrived at the new 
destination. 
Article 39 
(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack 
of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice 
to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of 
conformity within a reasonable time after he has 
discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to 
rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does 
not give the seller notice thereof at the latest 
within a period of two years from the date on which 
the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, 
unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a 
contractual period of guarantee. 
Article 40 
The seller is not entitled to rely on the 
provisions of articles 38 and 39 if the lack of 
conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could 
not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to 
the buyer. 
EXCERPTS FROM REVISED ARTICLE 2 SALES 
JULY 29 - AUGUST 5, 1994 DRAFT 
Revised Section 2-313. Express Warranties By 
Affirmation, Promise, Description, or Sample. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(b): 
(1) An affirmation of fact or promise by the 
seller, including a manufacturer, made directly or 
through a dealer to the buyer which relates to the 
goods presumptively becomes part of the agreement 
between the seller and buyer and creates an express 
warranty that the goods will conform to the 
affirmation or promise. To create an express warranty 
by affirmation or promise, it is not necessary that 
the seller use formal words, such as "warrant" or 
••guarantee", or have a specific intention to make a 
warranty. 
(2) A description of the goods presumptively 
becomes part of the agreement between the seller and 
buyer and creates an express warranty that the goods 
will conform to the description. 
(3) A sample or model that is made part of 
the agreement presumptively creates an express 
warranty that the whole of the goods will conform to 
the sample or model. 
(b) An express warranty is not created under 
subsection (a) if the seller establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the buyer was unreasonable in 
concluding that an affirmation, promise, description, 
or sample became part of the agreement. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(d), a description, affirmation of fact, or promise 
made by a seller, including a manufacturer, to the 
public which relates to goods to be sold presumptively 
creates an express warranty to any buyer that the 
goods will conform to the description, affirmation, or 
promise. Subject to Section 2-318, the buyer may 
enforce the express warranty directly against the 
seller, whether or not the express warranty is part of 
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the contract with the buyer's immediate seller.. 
(d) An express warranty is not created under 
subsection (c) if the seller establishes th~t the 
description, affirmation of f act , or promise: 
(1) was made more than a reasonable time 
before or after the sale; 
(2) was made to a segment of the public of 
which the buyer was not a part; or 
{3) resulted from a mistake upon which the 
buyer did not reasonably rely. 
Section 2-314(b)(7): 
To be merchantable, goods, at a minimum, must: 
{7) in the case of goods purchased for human 
consumption or for application to the human body, be 
reasonably fit for consumption or application. 
Section 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of 
warranties. 
{a) words or conduct relevant to the creation of 
an express warranty and words or conduct tending to 
negate or limit a warranty must be construed whenever 
reasonable as consistent with each other. Subject to 
Section 2-202 with regard to parol or extrinsic 
evidence, words negating or limiting a contract are 
inoperative to the extent that construction is 
unreasonable. 
(b) Except in a consumer contract and as 
otherwise provided in subsection (d), to exclude or 
modify an implied warranty of merchantability or any 
part of it, the language must be in writing or 
contained in a record, merition merchantability, and be 
conspicuous. 
{c) Except in a consumer contract and as 
otherwise provided in subsection (d), to exclude or 
modify an implied warranty of fitness, the language of 
exclusion must be in a writing or contained in a 
record and be conspicuous. Language excluding all 
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it 
states "There are no warranties that extend beyond the 
description on the face hereof," or words of similar 
import. 
(d) Except in a consumer contract, the following 
rules apply: 
(1) All implied warranties are excluded by 
expressions like "as is", "with all faults", or other 
language that in common understanding or under the 
circumstances calls the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and clearly indicates that 
there is no implied warranty. 
(2) If the buyer before entering into the 
contract has examined the goods or the sample or model 
as fully as desired or has refused to examine the 
goods, there is no implied warranty with regard to 
nonconformities that an .examination in the 
circumstances would have revealed. 
(3) An implied warranty may be excluded or 
modified by course of dealing, course of performance, 
or usage of trade. 
(e) In a consumer contract, terms disclaiming or 
limiting the implied warranty of merchantability or 
the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose 
must be in a writing or record. The terms are 
inoperative unless the seller proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that the buyer understood and 
expressly agreed to the term. 
(f) Remedies for breach of warranty may be 
limited in accordance with this article on liquidation 
or limitation of damages and on contractual 
modification of remedy. 
Sec~ion 2-318. Ex~ension Of Express or Implied 
warranties. 
(a) A seller's express or implied warranty, made 
to an immediate buyer, extends to any person who may 
reasonably be expected to buy, use, or be affected by 
the goods and who is damaged by breach of the 
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warranty . In this section, "seller" includes a 
manufacturer, "goods" includes a component 
incorporated in substantially the same condit i on i nto 
other goods, and "protected person" means a person to 
whom a warranty extends under subsection (a). 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(c), the rights and remedies of a protected person 
against a seller for breach of a warranty extended 
under subsection (a) are determined by the enforceable 
terms of the contract between the seller and the 
immediate buyer and this article. 
(c) A buyer's rights and remedies for breach of a 
warranty are determined under this article, as 
modified by subsection (d), without regard to privity 
of contract or the terms of the contract between the 
seller and the immediate buyer if: 
(1) the buyer is a consumer to whom a 
warranty was extended under subsection (a) and the 
Magnuson-Moss warranty Act applies or the seller is a 
merchant under Section 2-314(a) who sold 
unmerchantable goods; or 
(2) the buyer is a member of the public to 
whom an express warranty was made by the seller under 
Section 2-313(c) or (d). 
(d) A buyer under subsection (c) has all of the 
rights and remedies against a remote seller provided 
by this article, except as follows: 
(1) To reject or revoke acceptance, notice 
must be given to the remote seller within a reasonaole 
time after the buyer discovers or should have 
discovered the breach of warranty. 
(2) Upon receipt of a timely notice of 
rejection or revocation of acceptance, the remote 
seller has a reasonable time either to refund the 
price paid by the buyer to the immediate seller or 
cure the breach by supplying goods that conform to the 
warranty. If the seller complies with this paragraph, 
the remote buyer has no further remedy against the 
seller, except for incidental damages under Section 2-
715(a). If the remote seller fails to comply with this 
subsection, the buyer may claim damages for breach of 
warranty, including consequential damages under 
Section 2-715(b). 
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a 
buyer has no right to consequential damages unless 
expressly agreed with the remote seller. 
(4) A [claim for relief] for breach of a 
warranty extended under subsection (a) or created 
under Section 2-313(a)(3) accrues no earlier than the 
time the remote buyer discovered or should have 
discovered the breach. 
(e) A seller may not exclude or limit the 
operation of this section. 
Section 2-606(c). 
(c) If a tender has been accepted, the following 
rules apply: 
(1) The buyer, within a reasonable time 
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered a 
breach, shall notify the seller of the breach. 
However, a failure to give proper notice does not bar 
the buyer from any remedy that does not prejudice the 
seller. 
(2) If the claim is one for infringement or 
the like and as a result of the breach the buyer is 
sued, the buyer must so notify the seller within a 
reasonable time after receiving notice of the 
litigation or be barred from any remedy over for 
liability established by the litigation. 
Section 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation 
of Remedy, Including Damages. 
(a) Subject to this section and Section 2-718: 
(1) an agreement may provide for remedies in 
addition to or in substitution for those provided in 
this article or limit or alter the measure of damages 
recoverable under this article, including limiting the 
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment 
of the price or to repair and replacement of 
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nonconforming goods or parts by the seller; and 
(2) resort to a modified or limited remedy 
is optional, but a remedy expressly agreed to be 
exclusive is the sole remedy . 
(b) If circumstances cause an exclusive agreed 
remedy under subsection (a) to fail of its essential 
purpose: 
(1) to the extent that the agreed remedy has 
failed, the aggrieved party has remedies as provided 
in this article; and 
(2) agreed remedies outside the scope of and 
not dependent on the failed agreed remedy are 
enforceable as provided in this section. 
(c) Consequential damages may be limited or 
excluded by agreement unless the limitation or 
exclusion is unconscionable. Except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (d), a limitation or exclusion 
of consequential damages for commercial loss is 
presumed to be conscionable. 
(d) In a consumer contract, the following rules 
apply: 
(1) If circumstances cause an exclusive, 
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose and 
the duration of any i mplied warranty has not expired, 
a buyer may revoke acceptance and may obtain from the 
seller either a refund of the price paid or a 
replacem~nt of the goods and has other remedies as 
provided in this article, to the extent permitted in 
Section 2-701. 
(2) Any term in the contract excluding or 
limiting consequential damages is inoperative unless 
the seller proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that the buyer understood and expressly agreed to the 
term. 
(3) A limitation or exclusion of 
consequential damages for injury to the person is 
unconscionable as a matter of law. 
Revised Section 2-725(c) second alternative 
(c) If a breach of warranty or indemnity occurs, 
(a claim for relief] accrues when the buyer discovers 
or should have discovered the breach. 
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